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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

REACTION TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S USSR VISIT:

Soviet treatment of the visit - page 1

East European comment - page 12

Hanoi's behavior - page 17

STATSPEC

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1 JUNE 1972
(VOL. XXIII, NO. 22)

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 22 - 28 MAY 1972

<u>Moscow (3137 items)</u>			<u>Peking (1278 items)</u>		
Nixon USSR Visit	(2%)	16%	Domestic Issues	(39%)	34%
CPSU Central Committee	(6%)	8%	[30th Anniversary of	(--)	7%]
Plenum			Mao's Yenan Talks		
Tito 80th Birthday	(--)	4%	Indochina	(26%)	13%
Anniversary of Egyptian-	(--)	3%	[Sihanouk Tours PRC	(3%)	4%]
Soviet Friendship			Syrian Government	(0.2%)	7%
Treaty			Delegation in PRC		
Kadar 60th Birthday	(--)	3%	Afghan National Day	(--)	7%
African Liberation Day	(0.1%)	3%	African Liberation Day	(--)	7%
Indochina	(6%)	2%	Proclamation of Sri	(--)	7%
China	(2%)	2%	Lanka Republic		
FRG Ratification of	(4%)	2%			
Treaties					

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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U. S. - S O V I E T S U M M I T

MOSCOW SUMS UP EPOCH-MAKING TALKS OF BENEFIT TO "MANKIND"

Moscow's public appraisal of President Nixon's nine-day visit, spelled out authoritatively in a PRAVDA editorial the day after the President's departure on 30 May, draws together the basic themes of Soviet media's ample publicity for the summit:

+ The talks were a fruition of the Brezhnev leadership's consistent pursuit of the "Leninist" foreign policy course staked out at the 24th CPSU Congress--a course that combines the quest for coexistence, detente, and negotiations with ideological vigilance and fealty to "proletarian internationalism."

+ They produced epoch-making agreements that will benefit "all mankind," first and foremost the strategic arms limitation accords, thereby reconfirming the efficacy of this foreign policy line and, by implication, vindicating the leadership's decision to go ahead with the summit despite Vietnam.

+ These results were achieved at no cost to the USSR's military strength, ideological purity, or firm commitment to proletarian internationalism.

At pains to assuage any misgivings or concern at home or among the USSR's allies, Moscow has highlighted strong approval by "the fraternal socialist countries" in rounding up favorable world reaction to the summit and has laid an insistent stress on approval by "all" the Soviet people.

PRAVDA'S SUMMING-UP Entitled "Important Results," the 31 May PRAVDA editorial appeared side by side with the frontpage text of the joint communique. It was carried in full by TASS, which normally transmits full texts only of press articles or editorials deemed of major importance. "The talks and the documents signed," PRAVDA said, "will have a great importance for changing the political climate in the world for the better." And the results, demonstrating the possibility of "businesslike cooperation" as well as improvement of bilateral relations despite "differences and even polarity," represented "new important steps" in the foreign policy program being "steadily and consistently implemented by the Central Committee and Politburo."

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Underscoring the picture of the summit as confirmation of the correctness of the leadership's policy, PRAVDA recalled Brezhnev's statement on 20 March that an improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations was possible--and here PRAVDA added the standard caveat that such an improvement is "of course" desirable only so long as it does not adversely affect "any third countries or peoples."

Highlighting the document on "Basic Principles of Relations Between the USSR and the United States,"* signed by Brezhnev and the President on the 29th, the editorial singled out for direct quotation the first point on the two sides' undertaking to "proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence." Paraphrasing point two, it skipped over the avowal of a need to prevent "the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation" of bilateral relations, noting the two sides' pledge to do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to be prepared to settle differences by peaceful means in a spirit of reciprocity. PRAVDA's listing of the agreements signed led off with the accords on strategic arms limitation, "one of the most important questions" in Soviet-U.S. relations, and the editorial stressed that the accords are based on the principle of equal security.

SOVIET MEDIA COVERAGE The prominent, detailed central press coverage of the President's visit featured frontpaged accounts of the meetings between the Soviet leaders and the President, the speeches, and the agreements reached, with accompanying pictures of signing ceremonies and wreath-layings. The extent of PRAVDA's frontpage coverage expanded as the talks progressed, with reports and photographs

* Like its closest counterpart, "the document entitled 'The Principles of Cooperation Between the USSR and France'" signed by Brezhnev and French President Pompidou on 30 October 1971 during the former's visit to France, the Soviet-U.S. formulation of principles is consistently referred to as a "document" or "joint document"--not as a "statement" or "declaration." The shorter document signed by Podgornyy and Turkey's Sunay on 17 April of this year, by contrast, was identified as a "Declaration of the Principles of Good-neighborly Relations" between the two countries.

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given increasingly prominent placement as the successive agreements were signed. The text of the ABM treaty dominated the front page on the 28th, and the text of the joint communique was given a similar six-column spread on the 31st alongside the summing-up editorial.

The press, radio, and television coverage included minimal comment during the early stages of the visit. Such comment as appeared did little more than recapitulate the reports on the meetings and review favorable domestic and worldwide reaction. Appraisals of the progress of the talks by "the Soviet leaders" were conveyed through publicity for the status reports by Leonid Zamyatin, TASS director and head of the press center, at his joint press conferences with White House press spokesman Ronald Ziegler. Time-marking radio and press comment widely paraphrased Zamyatin.

After the announcement of the first four agreements--on protection of the environment, on medical research and public health, on cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, and on cooperation in science and technology--Zamyatin moved on 24 May from a portrayal of the atmosphere as "frank and businesslike" to a characterization of the talks as "frank, businesslike, and constructive." By the 25th the "frank" was dropped and "constructive" was emphasized in the formula "constructive and businesslike."

Commentaries appraising the substance of the talks came only after the signing late on the 26th of the treaty on limiting antimissile defense systems and the interim agreement on limiting land- and submarine-based missiles. The Moscow domestic service interrupted a regularly scheduled program shortly after 11 p.m. Moscow time on the 26th to broadcast live coverage of the signing ceremony, with U.S. affairs specialist Zorin as reporter. The major central newspapers for the 27th carried TASS' account of the signing ceremony along with a large frontpage photograph, and the text of the accords appeared in PRAVDA and RED STAR on the 28th; the first authoritative press commentary on the summit outcome, pegged to the accords, appeared in PRAVDA on the 29th in an editorial hailing the "step of tremendous importance." IZVESTIYA, which

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carried the text of the accords in its 30 May morning edition,* followed up in that day's evening edition with an editorial entitled "Policy of Peaceful Coexistence in Operation" that singled out the strategic arms limitation accords as "a step of truly great importance."

SENSITIVITY ON TROUBLE SPOTS Moscow's political sensitivities were reflected in the media's treatment of President Nixon's televised address to the Soviet people on the 28th. Carried only on TV, with no live broadcast at the same time over Radio Moscow, the address was heavily sanitized in subsequent summaries over the radio and in the press. The longest radio version for domestic listeners was an eight-minute summary. TASS and PRAVDA summaries omitted, most notably, the President's statement on the need for restraint by the great powers in supplying arms to other nations and his comment that the great powers should not allow smaller nations to drag them into war.

In a single striking exception to the pattern of comment through the first four days of the talks, confined essentially to reviews of the agreements and favorable reaction, the weekly NEW TIMES came out on 26 May with an article by Zagladin--widely summarized by Radio Moscow--which amounted to a rationale for the USSR's detente policy and particularly for its restrained line on Vietnam and decision to go ahead with the summit. Pegged to the CPSU Central Committee plenum of the 19th, the article rebutted the view of unnamed circles that the Soviet Union should respond in kind to "tough actions by imperialism." Zagladin argued the need rather for "flexible" tactics and "long-term perspectives," specifically citing in this context "the skillful combination of different--military, political, and diplomatic--methods of struggle that have enabled the heroic people of Vietnam to achieve such enormous successes."**

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REACTION REPORTS Portraying widespread public support for the summit, Soviet media have been publicizing numerous comments from "Soviet citizens" as well as Soviet bloc and U.S. and other Western media hailing the outcome of the summit. Typical of the testimonials from Soviet citizens was a letter in PRAVDA from "a shepherd from Kirghizia," quoted by TASS as observing that "the important agreements signed at the summit strengthen the security of all nations and peoples and are a tremendous success of the policy of peaceful coexistence being carried out by our Communist Party." The letter was also quoted as saying the summit had helped raise Soviet prestige in the international arena. A similar message from a group of Smolensk workers hailed the talks as a contribution to peace and suggested that they would also contribute to a more rapid improvement in the Soviet people's living standards.

On the 30th TASS prefaced a roundup of favorable world reaction with the statement that the talks are being assessed everywhere as "of epoch-making significance." Another TASS roundup that day emphasized East European approbation, among other things quoting Budapest's MAGYAR NEMZET to the effect that "the widening of Soviet-American cooperation is not to the detriment of the rights and interests of any third countries and peoples." TASS quoted the New York TIMES' view that the results exceeded the forecasts of the pessimists but neglected to mention the TIMES' added comment that it fell short of the hopes of the optimists who looked for movement on Vietnam and the Middle East.

SALT, DISARMAMENT Moscow's first authoritative comment on the summit, the 29 May PRAVDA editorial on SALT, set the pattern for a considerable followup propaganda effort to play up the ABM treaty and the interim agreement as "a step of tremendous importance" in nuclear disarmament--a step which, with other previously reached disarmament measures, is "designed to help avoid a new round in the strategic arms race and thus promote the prevention of the danger of a nuclear missile conflict."

Clearly contrived to reassure the Soviet people as well as Moscow's communist allies that the new accords will not compromise Soviet military strength or ideological purity, the editorial opened by invoking Lenin on the need for coexistence and negotiations, reaffirmed the need to wage an "irreconcilable struggle in the future against the aggressive imperialist forces," and insisted that "the CPSU is not deviating a single step from its ideological

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principles--from the immutable principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism." In a passage clearly for domestic consumption, it stated that the accords would "increase the well-being of the Soviet people" as well as the USSR's military might.

Reiterating comments made by USSR press spokesman Zamyatin on the evening of the 26th, echoed by Kosygin in his dinner speech that evening and reflected in the joint communique, PRAVDA declared that the treaty and the interim agreement "do not give either of the sides unilateral military advantages" and "are based on their equal security." And in another statement of reassurance to its Soviet readers, PRAVDA described the accords as a result of the CPSU's "Leninist peace policy" and a victory for the Soviet people, where Kosygin in his speech on the 26th had called them "a great victory for the Soviet and American peoples." PRAVDA's summing-up editorial of 31 May echoed the editorial of the 29th in stating that the accords will help curb the arms race, which diverts "huge funds from constructive purposes."

In its comment immediately preceding the President's arrival, the PRAVDA editorial of 21 May, which reflected the report on international affairs delivered by Brezhnev at the CPSU Central Committee plenum on the 19th, had made no direct mention of the SALT negotiations in a passage on Soviet-U.S. relations. But PRAVDA's editorial four days earlier had repeated the standard Soviet line that both Soviet and U.S. interests could be met by reaching a "mutually acceptable agreement" at SALT.

At this writing, Moscow has yet to publicize the details of the protocol, signed by Brezhnev and the President on the 26th, which explicitly outlined the allotment of ballistic missile submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) for both sides. The TASS international service in Russian on the 27th and PRAVDA and RED STAR on the 28th carried the texts of the ABM treaty and interim agreement without mentioning the existence of a protocol. The closest Moscow media have come to an acknowledgment of this document ("an integral part" of the interim agreement) is the statement by TASS in reporting the signing ceremonies on the 26th: The interim agreement, TASS said, "sets limits on the number of modern ballistic missile-carrier submarines to be had by each of the sides while the agreement is in effect and sets limits

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on the total number of ballistic missile launchers on atomic submarines." Subsequent reports and commentaries have confined themselves to this language, with no elaboration. There have also been frequent echoes of TASS' observation that the treaty and interim agreement establish "a mutual relationship between strategic offensive and defensive armaments" and that they "will facilitate more favorable conditions for holding further vigorous negotiations on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons."

Where the joint communique states that "a world disarmament conference could play a role" in bringing about a general and complete disarmament "at an appropriate time," the 31 May PRAVDA editorial said that the two sides noted the "importance of a world disarmament conference" to achieve total disarmament but dropped the "appropriate time" phrase and the ambiguous "could," thereby bringing the call for a conference more into line with the standard Soviet position that it should be held as soon as possible.

TASS and PRAVDA reported that Secretary Laird on 27 May ordered a halt to the construction of the ABM system in Montana, adding that he also ordered a "temporary" suspension of work on other ABM bases. Citing the Secretary's reference to U.S. obligations under the new treaty, TASS also noted the Secretary's order to temporarily stop all research and development work on antimissile defense proscribed by the Soviet-U.S. accords. In harmony with the theme that the accords are harbingers of other possible disarmament agreements, a dispatch in PRAVDA on the 30th quoted U.S. SALT delegation head Gerard Smith's remark of 28 May that the arms accords are "a good foundation for establishing control over all other types of strategic arms."

Publicizing statements by U.S. Congressional leaders in its wide and prominent coverage of favorable worldwide response to the accords, Moscow has also taken brief note of statements of opposition by the "hawks"--naming Senators Jackson and Goldwater and Representative Ashbrook in this category--who have lost their "sense of reality" in a changed world.

EUROPEAN SECURITY Coming on the heels of the final reading of the FRG-Soviet treaty in the West German Bundestag on 19 May and its signing on the 23d by President Heinemann, President Nixon's visit has been used by Moscow in conjunction with the FRG ratification to step up its propaganda drive for convening of a conference on European security and

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cooperation. Where the communique on the summit states only that both sides "are in accord that multilateral consultations looking toward a conference on security and cooperation in Europe could begin after" the Big Four accord on Berlin is signed and that both "agree that the conference should be carefully prepared" and "convened at a time to be agreed by the countries concerned, but without undue delay," the 31 May PRAVDA editorial returned to a more normal Soviet line: The USSR and the United States, PRAVDA said, "pointed to the importance of an all-European conference on security and cooperation, which is being prepared."

Moscow has underscored U.S. concurrence in the Soviet call for preparations for a European conference. TASS on the 30th promptly reported Secretary Rogers' statement in Bonn, upon his arrival for the NATO ministerial meeting, to the effect that Washington "is ready to participate in a multilateral preparatory conference in Helsinki next autumn and, later on, an all-European security and cooperation conference." Commenting on the NATO Council's communique of the 31st, TASS said NATO "can no longer ignore" the question of a collective security system in Europe and therefore expressed readiness to begin multilateral negotiations on preparations for a conference and accepted the Finnish proposal to hold such talks in Helsinki. A Moscow domestic radio commentary on the 30th had urged a public statement from the NATO Council outlining its stand on the European conference, pointing out that "events in Europe have swept aside all the so-called preliminary conditions for convening the conference which had been advanced in the past by NATO." Soviet media have noted praise for the SALT agreements by both Rogers and Brandt at the NATO session.

Regarding the issue of reduction of armed forces and armaments (MBFR) in Europe, the 31 May PRAVDA editorial made no reference to the U.S.-Soviet communique's statement that "a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments, first of all in central Europe," would serve to insure stability and security in Europe and that an "appropriate agreement should be reached as soon as practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in a special forum." Following the January meeting of the Warsaw Pact leaders in Prague, which called for the reduction of both "foreign and national" armed forces and armaments in Europe "in such a manner as not to be to the detriment of the countries taking part in such a reduction" and in such a way that it is not "the prerogative of the existing military-political alliances in Europe," Moscow has made only passing reference to this issue in routine commentaries.

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Podgornyy, in remarks at the final proceedings for Soviet ratification of the USSR-FRG treaty on 31 May, did say that "agreement on nonuse of force on an all-European scale" would afford an opportunity to draft specific measures on disarmament "and reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe." But the general reluctance to bring up the issue was illustrated in Moscow's reports on the NATO session. Recounting NATO Secretary General Luns' press conference on the eve of the session, Moscow ignored his entire discussion of MBFR, which included the remark that the USSR seems now to be returning "to the attitudes of the Tbilisi speech." In that speech on 14 May 1971, Brezhnev reiterated the call for negotiations on force reduction which he had broached six weeks earlier at the CPSU Congress. The 31 May TASS dispatch on the NATO Council's communique made no reference to the passages calling for "multilateral exploration" on MBFR "as soon as practicable, either before or parallel with multilateral talks on a conference on security and cooperation in Europe."

WEST GERMAN TREATY Of the speakers at the Supreme Soviet Presidium session that completed the Soviet ratification of the Moscow-Bonn treaty on 31 May, only Belorussian party head Masherov referred directly to the U.S.-Soviet summit. According to TASS' account of his speech, he echoed Gromyko, Suslov, Podgornyy, and others in lauding the Soviet "peace policy" in general and the Moscow-Bonn treaty in particular, then declared that Bonn's ratification of the treaty and "the successful Soviet-American summit talks" represent "a logical and natural result of the tireless, consistent, and Leninist far-sighted activities of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the Soviet Government, and Leonid Brezhnev personally, and also Nikolay Podgornyy, Aleksey Kosygin and other Politburo members." Stressing Brezhnev's leadership during the summit, Masherov added that "Comrade Leonid Brezhnev's role and services in this great matter are really outstanding."

The Soviet speeches at the Presidium session emphasized that the West German treaties finally confirm the status quo in Europe--the "inviolability" of the existing state borders--some 27 years after the end of World War II and that the signatories have renounced the use of force in their relations. Summing up the Presidium's proceedings, Podgornyy called the implementation of the Soviet-FRG treaty "one of the momentous events in the history of international relations in the postwar period."

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MIDDLE EAST Meager current Soviet comment on the Arab-Israeli conflict sheds no light on Moscow's interpretation of the statement in the joint communique of the two sides' "readiness to play their part" in bringing about a peaceful settlement. The reference to steps toward a military relaxation following a peaceful settlement is in line with Moscow's long-stated view, enunciated by Kosygin at his UN press conference in June 1967, that limitation of arms shipments to the Middle East can only be achieved after restoration of peace in the area, including first of all Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. The only public reference to the Middle East by a Soviet leader during the President's visit came from Kosygin in his 26 May dinner speech, when he called for eliminating the "hotbeds of war" in Vietnam and the Middle East on the basis of respect for the rights of peoples to independent development, to noninterference in their internal affairs, and to the inviolability of their state territories.

An Arabic-language commentary on the 31st constitutes Moscow's sole followup to the Middle East portion of the communique thus far. It assured the Arabs that the results of the Moscow talks were "positive" with regard to a just solution of the Middle East dispute. As if to dispell Arab fears of a U.S.-Soviet deal at the Arabs' expense, it declared that Moscow's position in the bilateral talks "fully corresponded" with Brezhnev's statement, in his 20 March speech, that an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations was desirable but not at the expense of other peoples or countries. The commentary went on to cite the communique's support for a peaceful solution, for Resolution 242, and for the Jarring mission and to assail Israel for its refusal to withdraw from the occupied territories and to cooperate with Jarring. It reiterated the communique's language on U.S.-Soviet readiness to "fulfill their role" in realizing a peaceful solution, but it did not remind the Arabs of the reference to "military relaxation" following such a settlement.

BROADCASTS Soviet broadcasts provided Chinese listeners with
IN MANDARIN extensive reportage on the President's visit, stressing the cordiality of the talks and their substantive results. Comment aired in Mandarin has generally hewed to the lines of Soviet central media in stressing the international significance of the summit, and of the arms limitation accords in particular, but it has been predictably more pointed in underscoring the Soviet Union's loyalty to the national liberation struggle and to the DRV in particular.

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After the communique was released, a typical broadcast in Mandarin on 31 May said "it is out of the question that the development of Soviet-U.S. relations will impair the legitimate rights and interests of any third nations." The broadcast added that while the Soviet Union is interested in improving relations with the United States, "our country has unswervingly stood on the side of the national liberation movement and rendered various types of aid to Asian, African, and Latin American countries." In this context the broadcast cited the passage in the communique in which Moscow reaffirmed its support for the DRV.

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EAST EUROPE ALLIES HAIL RESULTS AS SUCCESS OF SOVIET POLICY

Moscow's orthodox East European allies have warmly endorsed the summit outcome as a triumph for the Soviet policy of coexistence, while in some instances pointing up the still unresolved issues of Indochina and the Middle East. Romania in limited, carefully measured comment and Yugoslavia in voluminous discussion have been restrained in their appraisal of the results of the talks. Albanian media sustained a barrage of attacks on both sides throughout the course of the negotiations for self-serving collusion at the expense of "the freedom and independence of peoples."

POLAND Warsaw media were largely preoccupied, at the windup of the President's USSR visit, with his imminent arrival in the Polish capital on the 31st. Thus the party daily TRYBUNA LUDU on that day noted that the President "is coming to Poland at the moment of a historical breakthrough in relations between the East and the West." It hailed the President's visit to Warsaw as "one more evidence of the established prestige of Poland in the world and the growing role the Polish capital plays in international politics generally, and in Europe specifically." A 30 May Warsaw radio talk viewed the President's visit to Poland as indicating "a turn toward implementing the principles of peaceful coexistence," which it said was achieved "despite the unfavorable phenomena, particularly the U.S. escalation of the Vietnam war." In hailing the results of the Moscow talks, the commentary at the same time noted that the talks "also resulted in stating the differences in view in matters where divergencies are deep."

A PAP report of the President's arrival in the Polish capital on the 31st said "Warsaw welcomed him as the leader of his great country, with all the honors due to a head of state, and with the dignity and hospitality for which the Polish nation is well known." Emulating the Moscow greeting, the Polish welcoming delegation at the Warsaw airport included President Henryk Jablonski and Premier Piotr Jaroszewicz, but not Polish party First Secretary Edward Gierek.

Premier Jaroszewicz carefully offset his portrayal of the long-standing "traditions" binding the United States and Poland with expressions of solidarity with the USSR, in his speech at the state dinner for the President carried in full by PAP on the 31st. Citing Poland's "tested friend, the Soviet Union,"

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Jaroszewicz said his country "has linked her fate with socialism and is a permanent and important member" of the socialist community. He stressed that the United States "can make an important positive contribution" to the work of the projected European security conference and voiced "great satisfaction" over "the United States' declaration of its readiness to join in the multilateral, practical preparations" for the conference. The Premier "congratulated" the President and the Soviet leaders on the agreements reached in the Moscow talks--"the practical confirmation of the principle of peaceful coexistence and a sign of transition from the era of confrontations to the era of negotiations."

"Frank and useful" talks between the President and First Secretary Gierek were briefly reported by PAP on the 31st. They reportedly dealt with "both international issues and the main problems connected with Polish-American relations." PAP on 31 May and 1 June carried reports of the signing of the U.S.-Polish consular agreement in Warsaw by Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Olszowski, as well as a summary of its main points. The Warsaw domestic service reported on 1 June that "the joint Polish-U.S. statement" would be signed that day at Belweder Palace.

EAST GERMANY Fairly extensive GDR coverage of the President's trip included a dispatch by the East Berlin radio's Warsaw correspondent on the 31st reminding the Poles of their obligations to the Soviet bloc. It observed that Poland is "a solid link in the community of socialist states" and that Poland, "like other socialist states, takes a negative stand toward many aspects of U.S. policy, particularly with regard to the U.S. intervention in Indochina." At the same time, it observed that the results of the Moscow negotiations "should have positive effects on the Warsaw talks" and that "special impulses are expected here particularly with regard to an acceleration in preparations for a European security conference, in which the United States will also participate."

The East Berlin radio on the 30th registered "an unreserved 'yes'" to the rhetorical question whether the Moscow talks had achieved a step forward in disarmament, relaxation of tension, and peaceful coexistence. At the same time, while stressing that "no understanding was reached with Nixon on Vietnam," it had harsh words for the President's alleged inference, in his 28 May speech on Moscow TV, that "it was Vietnam which had dragged the United States into war."

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The commentator remarked that "nobody fell for that one--not in the USSR, not here." He wound up with praise for the agreement on strategic arms limitation and the progress toward a European security conference, noting the significance of the latter "when one recalls that the U.S. ruling circles once upon a time set out to roll back socialism."

CZECHOSLOVAKIA Continuing voluminous Czechoslovak comment has been effusive in hailing the results of the Moscow talks as a success for Soviet foreign policy. Thus Gustav Husak, in a 31 May RUDE PRAVO interview publicized by CTK the previous day, praised the "basic principles" document and the final communique, declaring in addition that the identification of "different" views in the communique was "another evidence of the high-principled, class, and internationalist stand of the Soviet Union, whose positions we fully support." Husak also took the occasion to urge that talks between Czechoslovakia and West Germany "proceed from the exploratory phase to the stage of official negotiations" to achieve a "normalization" of relations which "should be accompanied by appropriate binding steps concerning the invalidity of the Munich diktat from the very beginning." He called for "opening multilateral consultations without delay" for the convocation of a European security conference and called Helsinki "the most suitable place for these consultations."

Prague made less of a point of U.S.-Soviet differences than East Berlin comment did. In tune with Husak's stance, a Bratislava domestic service commentary on the 30th noted that the final communique "contains an explanation of the positions" of the two sides, "and these are by no means concurring positions on the world conflicts, being backed up by personal involvement as well."

HUNGARY Budapest coupled a measured endorsement of the results of the President's Moscow visit with censure of U.S. policy on Indochina, stressing in the latter connection that the United States' "predicament" in Vietnam had forced him to go to Moscow. An article in the party organ NEPSZABADSAG on the 30th by the paper's Moscow correspondent emphasized the "extremely good results" of the U.S.-Soviet negotiations and remarked in the same breath that the President's TV speech on the 28th "implied acknowledgment that the United States cannot help taking the Soviet Union's strength into consideration and accepting the compulsion of remaining in peaceful coexistence" with the USSR. It added

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that "directly opposing this reasonable attitude was Nixon's hints by which he practically seemed to call on the Soviet Union to give up its support of its allies." Moscow, the correspondent said, "abides by its principled stand" on Vietnam and the Middle East. In restrained terms, the article concluded that the Moscow talks showed that "despite all the irreconcilable social and ideological disagreements, there can be a seeking for cooperation for the sake of peace and international detente."

Uniquely in the comment from Moscow's East European allies, NEPSZABADSAG on the 31st drew an explicit contrast between the President's Moscow visit and his earlier one to Peking. In "comparison with Peking," the party daily said, "this time the world had no need to keep guessing from the vaguely general terms" of an "obscure communique what was in fact said at the talks." This comparison was prefaced with the remark that "this week, of course, has not changed the world; and contrary to his statement at his departure from Peking, not even President Nixon, half-winking at his voters, made any declaration to this effect." The paper added that "the objective manner of the negotiations, free of any ambivalence, pursued by the Soviet leaders, would indeed not have favored rhetorical phraseology of this kind."

BULGARIA Moscow's loyal Bulgarian ally hailed the results of the President's visit as an unqualified success of Soviet policy. First Secretary Zhivkov on the 30th told BTA that the strategic arms agreement and the "Basic Principles" document in particular attest to "the objective fact that the socialist community, headed by the Soviet Union, is the main force of the anti-imperialist front." This fact, he added, has brought about "a realistic approach" on the part of the capitalist states which the President's trip to the USSR exemplified. A commentary carried by BTA on the same day, under the title "A Great Victory of the Peaceful Soviet Policy," promised the Bulgarian people's support for "practical application" of the agreements. Bulgaria's comment, like Czechoslovakia's, muted the Vietnam issue.

ROMANIA Bucharest's first extensive comment on the Moscow talks since 24 May--a 1 June SCINTEIA article by one of the paper's leading foreign affairs commentators, Iliescu--was carried in full by AGERPRES the same day. Entitled "For the Development of Mutual Relations, of Peaceful Coexistence,"

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the article was more restrained than Romanian comment on the President's China visit had been. "As is known," it stated, "Soviet-American contacts and meetings at various levels have been held now for several years in a systematic manner." It added that, "falling within this framework," the President's Moscow visit is "an event of great importance for the bilateral relations of the two states and for international life."

In welcoming the strategic arms limitation and other agreements, the article went on to stress that "Romania considers it necessary that all states concerned" should participate in a European security conference "on an equal footing." It took a mild swipe at the United States on the issue of Vietnam, remarking that the U.S. position as stated in the Moscow communique is "in contradiction with the measures for the escalation of military intervention, which have been considerably aggravated of late." And it urged the "earliest possible" resumption of the Paris negotiations in order to find "solutions based on the realistic proposals of the DRV."

YUGOSLAVIA Belgrade, too, was less effusive on the significance and results of the Moscow summit than on the President's trip to China. Thus BORBA on the 30th said the results of the Moscow visit "certainly deserve serious attention," not so much for what is stated in the final communique "as by what could yet be forthcoming." The paper remarked that "if" the principles set down in the final joint document are respected in the future, they "may become a beneficial and constant source of optimism." BORBA estimated that the "most" progress in Moscow had been achieved on issues relating to Europe.

TANJUG's Moscow correspondent, also on the 30th, noted the "fruitful balance sheet of 10 documents" produced by the departing President, who left "the impression of an exhausted but satisfied and optimistic statesman" in his Moscow TV speech. The dispatch observed noncommittally that on both sides, "words were not spared in assessing some of the agreements signed in Moscow as 'historic.'" On Vietnam and the Middle East, it added, the two sides "only reaffirmed and possibly specified their positions in greater detail."

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INDOCHINA

The Hanoi radio and press have maintained their silence on President Nixon's Moscow visit; however, as during the President's Peking trip, a select group of North Vietnamese has been kept informed through foreign press reports carried by VNA's Vietnamese-language Morse transmission as well as by the service channels between VNA's Hanoi headquarters and its posts abroad. There has been no followup to the DRV press articles on the eve of the President's arrival in Moscow which had charged that he is "sowing disunity" in the socialist camp. But there have been continued vitriolic attacks on the President in connection with the U.S. air strikes against the DRV.

Moscow originated little comment on Vietnam during the President's visit. And Soviet concern to avoid sensitive issues was evidenced by, among other things, the excising of the President's allusions to the role of the great powers in such conflicts as Vietnam from replays of his Moscow TV speech. On the other hand, an article on Soviet foreign policy in the 26 May NEW TIMES was remarkably blunt regarding "some interpretations"--presumably including Hanoi's--of the international duty of socialist states. In a passage which seemed clearly related to the U.S. mining of DRV ports, the article questioned the correctness of the belief that "tough action by the imperialists" should prompt reaction in kind from socialist countries, particularly the USSR.

The DRV Foreign Ministry during the past week has continued its daily protests over the U.S. air strikes, routinely including the demand for an end to the mining of DRV ports. A 26 May statement by a spokesman for the DRV Ministry of Water Conservancy protested alleged U.S. strikes at the dike system. And on the 25th, a NHAN DAN article by a North Vietnamese lawyer labeled the President a "war criminal" for allegedly ordering strikes against dams and dikes.

Peking has been avoiding authoritative comment on Vietnam, limiting its coverage to carefully edited replays of foreign commentary. The Chinese called attention to Sino-Vietnamese unity during the recent stopovers of the DRV's Hoang Van Hoan, but there has been no indication of significant progress on aid questions.

DRV PRESS, RADIO MAINTAIN SILENCE ON PRESIDENT'S MOSCOW TRIP

The failure of the Hanoi radio and press to mention the President's Moscow trip accords with the practice during his February visit to China. However, at variance with the February pattern, during the

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Moscow visit Hanoi did not sustain a running barrage of charges that the President's policies are aimed at splitting the socialist countries. Such charges had appeared in the Hanoi press on 20 and 21 May--on the eve of the President's arrival in Moscow--but have not recurred. Moreover, available Hanoi propaganda to date has not followed the February practice of liberally quoting, without attribution, from the President's speeches and from the joint communique.* A commentary broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 29th seemed to allude to the Moscow visit, however, when it said cryptically: "While Nixon was ballyhooing about the so-called 'collaboration with all nations in building a peaceful world,' a U.S. Defense Department spokesman stated that the United States would attack and destroy all bases that support the war efforts of North Vietnam"

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] a Hanoi domestic service broadcast had reported that QUAN DOI NHAN DAN that day referred to a Kissinger press conference in Salzburg, Austria. Avoiding any reference to Moscow, Hanoi radio quoted the army paper as saying that "in his trip aimed at pushing the Nixon Doctrine," the U.S. President on 21 May had his security affairs adviser Kissinger hold a press conference in Salzburg, Austria, at which he said the United States would continue bombing and blockading North Vietnam.

The studied avoidance of any reference to the Moscow trip was again evidenced in a 31 May Hanoi radio report of bombing incidents during the President's stay in Iran. Hanoi's domestic service broadcast said that despite strict security measures "a series of bombs exploded" on 30-31 May, "as soon as Nixon and his entourage arrived in Teheran." VNA's press review for 1 June said that "the bombings

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in Teheran yesterday in which Nixon had a narrow escape were announced by both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in bold-type headlines." Hanoi's failure to mention that the President had been in the Soviet Union was the more glaring since the radio item observed that "it is recalled" that a few days ago, on 20 and 21 May when President Nixon was in Austria, large numbers of Austrians demonstrated, burning an American flag and shouting "Nixon, murderer." Hanoi pointedly left unexplained the President's whereabouts from 21 to 30 May.

MOSCOW REITERATES SUPPORT FOR VIETNAM, DEFENDS DETENTE POLICY

Soviet comment on Indochina during the President's visit was minimal and at a low level and generally avoided such sensitive issues as the U.S. mining of DRV ports and the role of the great powers in Indochina. However, an article in the 26 May NEW TIMES (No. 22) on Soviet policy--widely broadcast in Moscow radio's foreign-language transmissions between 26 and 29 May--in effect justified the restrained Soviet reaction to the mining of DRV ports. Entitled "Adherence to Principle and Consistency," the article was signed by Vadim Zagladin, a deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's international department,* and was pegged to the plenum held on the eve of the President's visit, although it did not mention the visit. NEW TIMES has been used in the past as the vehicle to disseminate the Soviet line abroad.

The Zagladin article was notable for its bluntness in defending the Soviet policy of coexistence and detente and in assailing those unnamed "people" who incorrectly interpret the question of the international duty of the socialist states. Zagladin made it clear that China was not the target of his criticism when he observed: "Of course now, particularly since China abandoned its recent opposition to peaceful coexistence, it is quite difficult to encounter open opponents of this principle." He continued in a vein that seemed clearly calculated to bring to mind the DRV and the U.S. mining of its ports:

People are encountered who, while seemingly pronouncing themselves in favor of the implementation of the

* The chief of the department, Ponomarev, was elevated to Politburo candidate member at the May plenum. Among Zagladin's published writings, an article in PARTY LIFE (No. 23, November 1970) on the 10th anniversary of the 1960 international party conference argued the need for a general line guiding the communist movement.

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coexistence principle, are in fact casting doubt on it in one way or another. For example, it is sometimes said that in response to a particular tough action by imperialism, the socialist countries--and above all the Soviet Union--must have no alternative but to react in the same way, to toughen their position too.

Zagladin argued that not only in Europe but in Vietnam the efficacy of a flexible posture has been demonstrated. Thus, he said that "only a skillful combination of different methods of struggle--military, political, and diplomatic--has enabled the heroic people of Vietnam and their leadership to achieve the enormous successes in the liberation struggle that we are now observing." He stressed that any international situation that arises, "even more so an acute situation," requires that the socialist states react in a flexible way and he concluded that "refusal to take long-term prospects into consideration is never beneficial."

JOINT COMMUNIQUE Soviet restraint was demonstrated in the passage on Indochina in the joint communique on the President's visit. Thus, the USSR expressed pro forma support for the struggles of the peoples of Indochina and declared that it stands for "a cessation of the bombing of the DRV and a complete and unequivocal withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops from South Vietnam." But it notably avoided any mention of the demand--made persistently by the DRV--for an end to the mining of ports.* Moscow also reaffirmed its support for the DRV and PRG proposals, which it said "provide a realistic and constructive basis for settling the Vietnam problem." TASS' 29 May report of the press conference that lay by U.S. and Soviet press spokesmen Ziegler and Zamyatin cited Zamyatin as reviewing the Soviet position on Vietnam as stated in the communique and as adding that the USSR "has given and will continue to give aid to the Vietnamese people." TASS failed to report that Zamyatin, asked whether the mining of Haiphong contradicted the spirit of the declaration of basic principles of relations between the United States and USSR, merely replied that the Soviet Union's

* The VNA press review of 29 May reported that both NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN printed a "recent" statement by the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry protesting the mining of DRV ports, but Moscow media are not known to have mentioned any such statement.

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official position on the mining had been stated several weeks ago and that nothing in the summit conference had changed its view.

The 31 May PRAVDA editorial repeated the Soviet pronouncements on Indochina in the communique, but it and other propaganda ignored the U.S. statement of position, which included expressions of support "for negotiations leading to the return of all American prisoners, the implementation of an internationally supervised Indochina-wide cease-fire, and the subsequent withdrawal of all American forces stationed in South Vietnam within four months, leaving the political question to be resolved by the Indochinese people themselves."

POLITICAL Kosygin, at a banquet speech on the 26th, took
SETTLEMENT pains to stress that no decisions would be made
 at the summit which were contrary to the
interests of other states. He also reiterated that "everything possible" should be done to eliminate hotbeds of war in Vietnam and the Middle East on the basis of "strict respect" for the rights of the people to independent development, noninterference in internal affairs, and inviolability of state territories.

A Moscow Vietnamese-language commentary pegged to the summit meeting broadcast on the 25th--the day before Kosygin spoke--stressed that the USSR's policies are always consistent with the interests of the socialist countries and that the Soviet Union has not departed from its principles in its negotiations with the United States. It asserted that the USSR seeks a solution to the problem in Southeast Asia and the Middle East by political means on the basis of respect for the rights of the victims of aggression. After repeating that the USSR "supports and aids" the Indochinese peoples, it reiterated that the war in Vietnam can be ended "only through negotiations." It expressed support for the DRV and PRG efforts to resume the Paris conference, and said that the people of Indochina must decide their own destiny without outside interference. At the same time it pointed out that a solution to the Vietnam war depends on the unity of the socialist countries because world socialism is the principal force which can stay the hands of the imperialists.

Another Vietnamese-language commentary, also on the 25th, endorsed the PRG and DRV demands to resume the Paris conference and stressed that "constructive" participation in the conference is the "way to end the Vietnam war." At the same time, TASS duly reported the latest DRV and PRG Paris delegations' demands that the Paris talks be resumed.

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OTHER PROPAGANDA During the President's visit to the USSR, Moscow media carried routine accounts of military action in South Vietnam along with brief reports of some of the DRV's continuing series of protests over U.S. bombing of the North. TASS atypically included a reference to mining in reporting a 25 May DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement. However, TASS obscured the fact that the spokesman was protesting the U.S. announcement that targets of the air strikes would be expanded to include industrial targets. It merely noted that the statement protested bombings by U.S. aircraft, including B-52's, of "populated areas in the DRV."

EXPANDED ATTACKS ON DRV SCORED, NIXON CALLED "WAR CRIMINAL"

Hanoi was quick to condemn the 23 May announcement by the Pentagon press spokesman that U.S. bombing of the DRV was being expanded to include industrial targets, with a foreign ministry spokesman's statement and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article on the 25th. The army paper quoted Pentagon spokesman Friedheim as saying that bombing policy was less restrictive than under President Johnson, that steel, engineering, and chemical works as well as cement factories and other industrial targets would be hit and that no industrial target could be ruled out. A Liberation Radio commentary on the 29th also mentioned specific targets, charging that the U.S. expansion meant that attacks would be aimed at power plants, iron-smelting plants, and steel mills. The commentary also acknowledged the Pentagon spokesman's announcement on the 24th that the number of B-52's in Indochina will be increased.

The foreign ministry spokesman said that the Pentagon announcement was only an acknowledgment of what the United States had been doing in North Vietnam since 6 April, and that "many" economic and cultural establishments had been hit in addition to schools and hospitals. The spokesman added that many sections of Haiphong, Vinh, and other densely populated areas have been the victim of "B-52 carpet bombings" carried out by "the U.S. imperialists maddened to the point of losing all human character." Both the spokesman and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN charged that dikes had been hit, with the army paper additionally citing strikes against bridges and roads.

TRANSPORTATION TARGETS, COMMANDO RAIDS

While Hanoi has generally been vague on the nature of U.S. targets, a 27 May QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial charged that "frenziedly escalating the war, the U.S. aggressors have concentrated on fiercely striking at the network of roadways and

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waterways in North Vietnam" in order to prevent the North Vietnamese "from fulfilling the duty of the great rear toward the great frontline" and to hinder production.* It charged that the U.S. has mined and blockaded the harbors and has bombed roads, bridges, dams, and warehouses. It further asserted that the U.S. "is also attempting to conduct surprise attacks by infantry or commandos in vital areas to sever our transportation to the frontline." The editorial stated that the "foremost duty" of the military communications and transportation forces is to "transport goods with the highest efficiency" to enable fighting forces on the battlefields to launch strong attacks and to insure troops on the battlefronts have enough supplies for combat.

The notion that the United States is using or plans to use commandos against the DRV appears in other propaganda as well, including editorials in NHAN DAN on the 26th and in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on 29 May and 1 June. The NHAN DAN editorial, dealing mainly with problems of domestic security and order,** charged that the United States has "waged intensive espionage and psychological warfare and may brazenly launch surprise raids and commando attacks against a number of areas" in order to shake the people's determination, cause instability, sabotage the economy and defense, and "create conditions for the development of negative activities by bad elements." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 29th accused the United States of landing "secret agents" in the North and on 1 June said the United States has "prepared to conduct raids and send commandos by sea and air to sabotage our rear."

STRIKES AT DIKES Allegations that the United States had bombed dikes had been included in a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's protest as early as 28 April. But the first protest from the DRV Ministry of Water Conservancy came only on 26 May. Released by VNA on the 30th, it rounded up alleged strikes at dikes from 10 April through 21 May; and it condemned the United

* A 28 April editorial in the army paper had similarly pointed to the nature of U.S. raids against the DRV's transportation and communications network. See the 3 May TRENDS, pages 20-21.

** The editorial calls for heightened protection of social order and political security and cites the recently released regulations on order, security, and market management under wartime conditions. For a discussion of those regulations see the 17 May 1972 TRENDS, pages 27-28.

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States for sending U.S. planes on "42 occasions to drop 580 demolition bombs of various sizes on the embankments of the Red River, and the Thai Binh, Day, Ma, Lam, and La Rivers in the Hanoi area, Thai Binh, Hai Hung, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, and Ha Tinh provinces." The statement said that in addition to these bombings, U.S. ships have "by day and night shelled many sea dikes" and U.S. planes and ships have also "ferociously attacked a number of irrigation works."

The statement charged that "these frenzied acts" are "obviously aimed at massive destruction of life and property of the population in densely populated areas" and that such "extremely savage acts are strictly banned by international law." A 1 June QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary, citing data from the water conservancy protest, accused President Nixon of attempting to bring "disaster" to the DRV people "in the hope of finding a way out."

The charge that the reported bombing of the dikes is a violation of international law was discussed at length in a 25 May NHAN DAN article attributed to lawyer Do Xuan Sang, who cited clauses of the 1908 Hague convention and the Nuremberg regulations as documentation. He acknowledged that President Nixon speaking in Texas on 30 April had said that the United States had refrained from bombing dikes because this would cause civilian casualties and that U.S. policy was to restrict damage to civilians. But he dismissed this as "President Nixon's propaganda" and claimed that in fact bombing had been carried out to weaken dike sections in Hanoi, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh and "to kill our compatriots who were working on the dikes to prevent floods." He concluded that "Nixon is a war criminal not only under international law but also under U.S. law."

Hanoi radio on 31 May broadcast what it described as the first of a series of articles exposing Nixon's "extremely cruel crimes against our northern people." Assailing the strikes since 6 April, the broadcast did not explicitly mention dikes when it said that "Nixon has become the era's most dangerous war criminal" However, the dikes were mentioned in another article on "Nixon's crimes"--broadcast by Hanoi radio on the 31st--which echoed charges in the water conservancy protest. The article said that President Nixon is "even more cunning than Johnson" since he "has not personally directed the daily bombings and shellings but has delegated the authority to direct them." But it added that the President still "cannot dodge the heavy responsibility for his

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policy of attacking civilians, which is severely forbidden by international law. It must be considered a horrible war crime violating" the Nuremberg regulation. A NHAN DAN editorial on 1 June marking International Children's Day also scored the President and his Administration for their "crimes" against Vietnamese children, and called on people from the socialist and other countries "to take active actions" to prevent further such crimes.

Concern for protecting the dikes both from U.S. attacks and possible floods during the rainy season was evidenced in a NHAN DAN editorial on 27 May. It cautioned that it is necessary to be vigilant and to organize the necessary forces because "the enemy often launched surprise attacks to destroy dikes at times when we are not taking precautions--before and during the flash flood season and when the water level is very high or low." It said that committees for flood and typhoon control at all levels must be composed of those who have ample experience and "a high sense of responsibility," and that they must be granted "full authority to solve urgent problems on the spot."

Hanoi's propaganda last fall following the devastating floods reflected dissatisfaction with the performance of some cadres in preventing, and later minimizing, the damage caused by the floods. And prior to the stepped up air strikes in early April, Hanoi propaganda had already reflected serious official concern about strengthening its dike system which had been weakened by the heavy flooding. In February, NHAN DAN publicized the regulations promulgated by the Council of Ministers in November 1963 on the protection of dikes and Hanoi radio broadcast "instructions" from the DRV Premier's Office "on the struggle against floods and storms." Hanoi radio in March announced the convening of a conference by the Premier's Office for "leading cadres of various sectors and organs at the central level and of chairmen of administrative committees and chiefs of water conservation offices of provinces and cities throughout the North" to learn from the flood experience in 1971 and "discuss trends in preventing and struggling against flash floods, floods and typhoons in 1972."

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY ISSUES DAILY PROTESTS OVER AIR STRIKES

Hanoi has continued to issue daily protests by the spokesman of the DRV Foreign Ministry. They all include a demand that the U.S. mining be ended, but only those on 30 and 31 May claim that the

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United States is continuing to drop mines. VNA on 1 June totals the planes allegedly downed during May, claiming a figure of 93 which brings its grand total to 3,625. (Hanoi claims that 178 planes have been downed in the past two months, but the U.S. Command in Saigon has reported only 28 downings since 6 April.)

Specific charges levied in the series of protests include the following:

+ The protest of the 25th charged that sections of Haiphong were bombed "repeatedly" on 18, 19, 23 and 24 May and that "many" civilians were killed or wounded and "many more" economic and cultural establishments were destroyed. It also said that many densely populated areas from Quang Ninh Province to the Vinh Linh area were bombed and shelled on the 24th. Other alleged action on the 24th that failed to prompt official protests was an attack on Nam Dinh city, said to have been the third attack in May. Hanoi claimed that 23 workers of a textile plant were killed or wounded, and that "dozens of houses were pulverized," killing at least eight and injuring "many others." Hanoi on the 25th also said that the day before there were attacks against irrigation works in Thai Binh Province, and that the sea dike system in Tien Hai district was attacked for the second time within a week, "resulting in serious damage to the fields."

+ The 26 May statement charged that on the 25th, the United States bombed and strafed Haiphong and "undertook a new step of war escalation by striking at a number of localities in Lang Son." It added that U.S. planes "continued to strike at many populated areas" in Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, and Vinh Linh, "killing and wounding a great number of civilians and destroying many houses and economic and cultural enterprises." The spokesman claimed that two planes had been downed.

+ The statement on the 27th said that on the 26th there were "barbarous" attacks on many places on the outskirts of Haiphong city and many sections of the Son Tay provincial capital, where many buildings including the Son Tay senior high school were destroyed. It also claimed "the bombing and shelling" of many densely populated areas in Quang Ninh, Yen Bai, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces and the Vinh Linh area.

+ The statement on the 28th charged that on the 27th, U.S. "savage raids" hit Vinh city, "many parts of the dikes along the Hong Ha River in Kien Xung district of Thai Binh Province, and

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many population centers" in the provinces of Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thai Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh, and Vinh Linh region. It asserted that U.S. warships "wantonly bombarded many villages on the coast of Nam Ha Province."

+ The statement on the 29th charged that on the 28th, the United States "barbarously bombed and strafed many populous areas" in Thai Binh, Nam Ha, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and in Vinh Linh. It said that on the same day, U.S. ships "indiscriminately bombarded a number of hamlets adjacent to the mouth of the Day River in Nam Ha Province" and that the United States "killed or wounded" many civilians and destroyed "many of our people's homes and economic establishments, including a number of water conservancy projects at Nam Dan."

+ The 30 May spokesman's statement charged that on the 29th, the United States sent planes "to continue to drop mines to blockade the harbor off Vinh city" as well as "barbarously bomb and strafe many populous areas" in Quang Ninh, Ha Bac, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and in Vinh Linh. It also said that U.S. ships "indiscriminately bombarded many coastal hamlets and villages of Nghe An and Quang Binh provinces" and hit many hamlets, villages, factories, farms, and economic and cultural establishments and a number of water conservancy projects, "killing or wounding many civilians, including many women and children."

+ The 1 June protest charged that on the 31st, "populous areas" in Ha Bac, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces and Vinh Linh area were "barbarously bombed and shelled." It said that also on that day, U.S. ships "indiscriminately launched artillery attacks against the coastal villages belonging to Nghe An, Ha Tinh and Quang Binh provinces" and that the U.S. dropped "bombs at random over a large number of homes, markets, factories, and farms, killing and wounding many innocent people."

CAPTURE OF
U.S. PILOTS

Although Hanoi continues to claim that U.S. airmen are being captured in North Vietnam, it has not identified them. The army paper QUAN

DOI NHAN DAN on the 25th carried an article which called the capture of U.S. pilots "an important requirement." Observing that each region and militia self-defense unit should have "concrete plans," it called for the employment of all means available, "such as horses, boats, bicycles and motorized vehicles." It said that in strategic areas, such as coastal and mountainous areas, "it is necessary to have control towers to disclose the enemy." The article noted that "it is necessary to collect and properly handle all the enemy's equipment, to correctly carry out the policies toward POW's," and "immediately take the captured pilots to higher echelons."

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HANOI COMMENTATOR DISCUSSES OFFENSIVE; CURRENT ACTION NOTED

TRUNG DUNG Hanoi's standard optimistic appraisal of the offensive
ARTICLE in South Vietnam was repeated in an article by the military commentator Trung Dung, published in the May issue of the army journal QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and broadcast by Hanoi radio on 28 May.* Recounting the communists' alleged achievements, Trung Dung claimed that a sizeable part of Saigon's troops has been put out of action, drastically changing the balance of forces on the battlefield; that many strong allied bases and allied defense tactics have been smashed; and that the allied pacification program has been frustrated and the "liberated area" enlarged. He also maintained that U.S. attacks against the DRV have been "dealt strong counterblows" and have not stopped the North's assistance to the South.

Trung Dung reaffirmed the view expressed in earlier Hanoi commentaries that the communist offensive has "created major changes in the war situation to our great advantage" and that "initial brilliant victories of strategic importance" have created "favorable conditions" for "smashing" Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine and achieving "complete victory." He lauded the "independent and creative military and political lines" guiding the fighting and the "offensive strategy" of "staging vigorous, successive attacks to overwhelm the enemy with all forces and all forms of struggle of people's war" while maintaining an "offensive stance on all battlefields." The offensive stance, according to Trung Dung, allows the coordination of attacks and uprisings and conventional and guerrilla warfare in all areas and against even the "strongest and best-defended bases." Among other things, Trung Dung also claimed that it is possible to "stage long-term, successive, and unrelenting attacks and to deal stronger and stronger blows in order to destroy the enemy's vital forces by big chunks and liberate many vast areas."

In scoring U.S. mining operations and air and naval attacks on the DRV, Trung Dung maintained that "the outcome of a war is decided primarily by ground forces. Air power cannot decide the issue of a war, even the

* Trung Dung has written significant military articles regularly in recent years. He analyzed Operation Lam Son 719 in an article published in the April 1971 issues of the party journal HOC TAP and the QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine and broadcast by Hanoi radio. (See the 21 April 1971 TRENDS, pages 6-7.) Articles by Trung Dung on the war also were published in the January 1971 QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine, in HOC TAP in July and March 1970, and in the May and April 1969 issues of the army journal.

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huge, modern U.S. Air Force." U.S. attacks on the North were said by Trung Dung to be a "frenzied, hopeless reaction" to a "defeated, weakened, and deadlocked situation." He maintained that the escalation of the attacks on the DRV will lead to heavier setbacks for "the U.S. imperialists" in the North and South and to "more serious political isolation" in the United States and world, adding that "contrary to Nixon's calculation, the Vietnam war is a hot problem in this year's elections . . . and is seriously threatening his political career." In his January 1971 QUAN DOI NHAN DAN magazine article, Trung Dung had been unusually explicit in predicting that there would be escalated U.S. attacks on North Vietnam in coming months. He charged that

Nixon must continue withdrawing U.S. troops and withdraw the bulk of U.S. ground combat forces in 1971, but he is very confused over the danger of the collapse of the puppet regime in South Vietnam during what is called the "key" stage of the "pacification" program. Because of this, the Nixon Administration is planning new, very insane military adventures against North Vietnam.

Trung Dung went on, in a passage which may have been anticipating the current communist offensive, to explain that as the United States withdraws, its position on the battlefield weakens, the attacks by the "Indochinese people" expand, and defeats are inflicted on Vietnamization, the United States will have to "vainly search for every possible way, including adventurous, reckless acts, to salvage its position."

BINH LONG Hanoi and Front propaganda on the fighting in Binh Long Province praises alleged communist achievements along Highway 13, from 19 to 24 May and on 29 May, and suggests a shift in the focus of their attacks from the besieged provincial capital of An Loc to the Saigon forces attempting to reach An Loc along the highway. A 26 May NHAN DAN article, for example, stressed the importance of the Highway 13 fighting when it claimed that the toll among the ARVN relief forces had surpassed that of the troops in An Loc. NHAN DAN praised the Binh Long PLAF for pinning down "an ever bigger enemy force," claiming that they have "threatened the enemy defense line northwest of Saigon" by besieging the ARVN in An Loc and intercepting troops on Highway 13. The paper added: "The Binh Long battlefield has attracted and decimated large enemy forces, thus creating favorable conditions for other battlefronts to rise up to hit the weakpoints of the enemy." A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN

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commentary on the 28th similarly praised the PLAF forces on Highway 13 and underlined the importance of cutting the allies' "strategic routes."

There had been little communist comment on the fighting in Binh Long since the flurry of propaganda following the spurious claim that the PLAF captured An Loc on 15 April. The current comment was anticipated, however, in a commentary broadcast by Liberation Radio on 9 May. The commentary, attributed to the PLAF organ QUAN GIAI PHONG, reviewed the fighting on Highway 13 and praised the forces there for achieving a "highly significant victory" by "annihilating a sizeable part of enemy strength and destroying a great volume of war materiel."

Strong attacks on government forces south of An Loc were reflected in the communist claims to have overrun Duc Vinh base complex, four kilometers south of An Loc, on 29 May. Duc Vinh, said to have fallen after a three-day siege, was reportedly defended by two main force battalions and two companies of the 9th and 21st ARVN divisions. Greeting this alleged achievement, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 30th claimed that the "blitz" against this position and other "victories" had foiled the allied "trick of establishing blocking clusters of positions, edging forward, and establishing contact among units in the hope of enabling relief forces to reach An Loc." Initial communist reports claimed that "survivors" from Duc Vinh fled to the Tan Khai base but were barred by the ARVN commander from entrance there. And on 31 May LPA carried a report charging that allied aircraft bombed the Duc Vinh area on the 29th, "exterminating over 50 of hundreds of wounded Saigon soldiers left behind on the battlefield in an attempt to cover up their setback." LPA said that most of the wounded soldiers had been treated by the PLAF and released and lightly wounded soldiers had moved southward, but the seriously wounded had remained and been killed in the air raid.

QUANG TRI, Vietnamese communist comment on the fighting in the
THUA THIEN two northernmost provinces of South Vietnam lauds
PLAF attacks from 21 to 27 May on government
defense lines south of the My Chanh River and west of Highway 12.
In addition, the communists deride the counteroffensive launched
by South Vietnamese marines in Quang Tri on 24 May. Commenting
on the communist attacks, an article in NHAN DAN on the 29th claimed
that the PLAF scored "repeated and substantial" victories in its
21-27 May attacks, killing or capturing nearly 2,350 allied troops.
The paper also asserted that the PLAF's "deep thrusts" broke allied
probing operations and "liberated many more areas."

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An article in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 26th commented on the 24 May marine landing in Quang Tri, claiming that the communists "dealt fierce deterrent blows to the enemy troops upon their landing, shot down two planes, and annihilated more than 200 men." According to the army paper, the remnant troops "fled in panic." The paper dismissed the marine attack as a "trick to appease the puppet army which is confused and shaken," claiming the allies were attempting to "create the illusion that the puppet army had recuperated and was counterattacking." The paper cited communist preparations for such attacks, noting that they had "established a reconnaissance net to press the enemy closely and to follow all the activities of enemy aircraft and warships, to accurately discern the enemy schemes, and to correctly assess his weaknesses and gaps in order to take the initiative in developing their combat forces under all circumstances." The communists had similarly deprecated marine attacks north of the My Chanh River on 13 May.

KONTUM Hanoi and Front media have not commented on the major communist attack on the provincial capital of Kontum which was launched on 25 May. However, on the 27th communist media publicized an appeal from the highlands PLAF command calling on ARVN troops to defect and warning that "the liberation armed forces are tracking down the enemy everywhere and are tightening their siege against the provincial capital." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 25th had carried an editorial on the past month of fighting in central Trung Bo which hailed achievements by the communist forces in the highlands and neighboring coastal provinces.

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PEKING FETES HOANG VAN HOAN, MUTES COMMENT ON THE WAR

Peking took the opportunity of North Vietnamese Politburo member Hoang Van Hoan's stopovers on 23 May and 25-27 May to display Sino-Vietnamese friendship, but there was no indication of any development on the knotty question of aid. Hoan passed through Peking en route to and from Ulan Bator, where he attended the funeral of the MPR chief of state. NCNA reported on 23 May that on his brief stopover that day Hoan was given a banquet at the airport by CCP Politburo member Chang Chun-chiao. On his return from Ulan Bator on the 25th, Hoan was again greeted by Chang, who later that day feted him at a banquet in Peking. As in other recent stopovers by North Vietnamese,* NCNA characterized the atmosphere in warm terms as being "alive with expressions of comradeship and brotherhood." NCNA noted briefly that Chang and Hoan proposed toasts to "new victories" in the Vietnamese war and to the consolidation of the "revolutionary friendship" and "militant unity" of the two countries.

Peking provided no further details on Hoan's two-day layover, other than to report his departure on the 27th. There was no mention of a meeting with Chou En-lai, who had seen him during a stopover last September and who had met with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy when they passed through recently. Hoan, who headed the DRV mission in Peking from 1950 to 1957, has long played a major role in international communist relations, and he apparently spent considerable time in China in late 1969 during a period of improved Sino-Vietnamese relations and the opening of Sino-Soviet talks in Peking. Though he might be expected at this juncture to use his stay in Peking to discuss aid questions, NCNA's accounts made no mention of this subject, indicating at least that neither side sees fit to portray progress on the aid issue.** NCNA noted the

* Peking's treatment of Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy during their recent stopovers is discussed in the TRENDS of 3 May, page 13, and 17 May, page 19. Unlike these visits, which were also reported by VNA, the North Vietnamese have yet to refer to Hoan's stopovers.

** Peking had also made no mention of aid in reporting Xuan Thuy's stopover on 13 May, but at a banquet for Le Duc Tho en route to Paris on 27 April, Chou En-lai was quoted by NCNA as promising continued Chinese support so long as the war persisted.

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presence at the airport of the DRV and PRG ambassadors, but there was no mention of DRV Vice Foreign Trade Minister Ly Ban, who arrived in Peking on 3 May "to discuss" the PRC's 1972 "supplementary assistance" to Vietnam. Ly Ban was last reported as present at the airport on 16 May when Xuan Thuy departed for Hanoi.

COVERAGE OF WAR Apart from Chang's toast to victories in the war, Peking has avoided authoritative comment on Vietnamese developments since Li Hsien-nien's 21 May criticism of U.S. "military blackmail and political schemes" and a provincial leader's attack on the U.S. interdiction measures during a banquet for Prince Sihanouk in Harbin on the 23d. Consistent with its effort to minimize Chinese involvement, Peking's coverage of the war has consisted largely of selected pickups of Vietnamese and other foreign accounts that have been carefully sanitized to accord with Peking's broader considerations. In addition to excising virulent criticism of the Nixon Administration from comment replayed in PRC media, Peking has simply ignored significant commentaries from Hanoi raising sensitive international issues. Peking did choose to report a 25 May NHAN DAN editorial reaffirming Hanoi's resolve to carry on the fight, but NCNA's carefully edited account conveyed a guarded assessment of the current situation. Thus, in a telling omission, NCNA deleted the editorial's claim of a "steadily ascending position" in quoting a passage saying recent developments have demonstrated the Vietnamese communists' "steel-like determination, great strength, and steadily ascending position." Reflecting Peking's more forthcoming approach to the United States as a negotiating partner, an NCNA report edited out a charge by Xuan Thuy concerning the President's "lack of good will" at the Paris talks, and a 27 May DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's denunciation of the President's "twaddle about 'peace' and 'cease-fire'" was omitted from NCNA's account.

In a departure from Peking's effort to avoid portraying U.S. actions as challenging Chinese interests, NCNA on the 24th repeated in full VNA's account of a visit by the DRV Vice Minister of Communications and Transport to Chinese sailors aboard two ships allegedly shelled by U.S. planes on 6-8 May. The sailors were quoted as condemning the U.S. interdiction measures and affirming their determination to ship supplies to Vietnamese ports. The North Vietnamese having publicized the event, Peking presumably judged that to repeat VNA's account would be a minimal gesture under the circumstances.

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CHINA

CAMPAIGN AGAINST LIN PRODES INTO HIS MILITARY ERRORS

The campaign against Lin Biao is increasingly being extended into the military arena, where he had exercised dominant power since 1959. The most specific charge against him is that he caused the military to neglect its fighting role by using it as an instrument to gain political power. During the cultural revolution PLA members were encouraged to be political advisers rather than fighters, and the military line stressing the invincibility of people's war paid scant attention to military training. This approach was criticized directly in a report on an enlarged session of the party committee of the Tsinghai Military District, broadcast by Sining radio on 15 May. The report said "swindlers" had claimed that "spiritual powers are almighty" in a "vain attempt to turn our army into a cultural contingent which can handle only the pen and not the gun." The use of the latter phrase serves to clear Mao of any involvement in the erroneous line; one of Mao's more famous dicta is that the army must exercise both the pen and the gun.

Other charges in the Tsinghai report also seem to point to Lin, especially one that the swindlers were "interested in power seizure alone and not in army building." This evidently refers to Lin's diverting a large proportion of PLA manpower to support-the-left power seizures during the early phase of the cultural revolution. The report also stated that PLA troops had criticized the theory that "power is above everything," probably an effort to show that the frequent citation during the cultural revolution of Mao's phrase "power grows out of the barrel of a gun" to justify army dominance was a misapplication.

That there have already been concrete results from the campaign favoring more military training has been shown most clearly in discussions of the role of the militia. A Honan broadcast on 20 May detailed some of the changes in one military subdistrict, pointing out major developments in two areas: increased military training and greater authority for the civilian party committee. The broadcast succinctly stated the latter development by specifying that the military subdistrict and the people's armed forces department were both "military branches of the regional party committee."

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To implement the new instructions on military training for the militia, the military subdistrict seems of necessity to have greatly curtailed its former role in the civil sector. The broadcast reported that the military subdistrict is now down to one secretary and one standing committee member taking care of routine matters, while three members devote full time to militia work and the others participate in militia work as part of their duties. Also, 10 cadres under the subdistrict have been withdrawn "from other related units" to be responsible for the region's militia work. The armed forces departments on lower levels have acted similarly so that even in communes "two or three armed forces cadres are generally assigned to do militia work full time." With such extensive participation in militia affairs, the PLA probably has relatively few personnel to spare for carrying out its former civil tasks, raising the question of whether the increased militia role--and indeed the increased attention to PLA military training--is not basically a facesaving way of reducing the military's voice in nonmilitary sectors.

PRC MEDIA CONTINUE TO URGE ADHERENCE TO RURAL POLICIES

Both central and provincial media are continuing their efforts to persuade cadres and the masses that current policy shifts to the right are to be taken seriously, no easy task considering the number of people who have been caught in the crunch by frequent shifts in the recent past. An article by a Hopei production brigade secretary which was published in PEOPLE'S DAILY on 25 May was accompanied by an editor's note stating that the article's main point--that party policies in the rural economy must be carried through in toto and not just through adherence to a general line--also applies to policies in other fields. In all of these areas the thrust of the ongoing campaign is that "leftism" has been the main deviation in the recent past.

The PEOPLE'S DAILY article criticized the view that "left is better than right," propounded by those who say that right deviation is a matter of line while left deviation is merely a question of method. The article specifically pointed to a time "during the cultural revolution" when "some comrades" said that workers who were asked to do extra work in sinking a well should receive no extra pay but should merely do it for the revolution--certainly a reflection of central policies at the time. The secretary, however, persuaded them to award pay and work points while "educating the workers to sink wells for the revolution."

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The parable of the secretary in the PEOPLE'S DAILY article, who clearly disregarded central instructions during the cultural revolution and yet has now emerged as an exemplary cadre, reflected the problem faced by the regime in getting policies implemented in a situation where the leadership is still unsettled and in an atmosphere of uncertainty generated by past turmoil and lurches in policy direction. A Shenyang article broadcast on 28 May illustrated one problem in trying to hew to correct policies. The article told of a commune which has tried to adhere to the current policy of "from each according to his ability and to each according to his work," resulting in some teams going too far and "improperly raising the rewards for some kinds of farm work." In other areas people have resisted any change, as reflected in a Tsinan broadcast on 6 May criticizing comrades influenced by leftist ideas of swindlers; some cadres were said to be afraid to practice a quota system for fear of deviating to the right.

One policy recently adopted is to raise peasant incentive by distribution to the peasants of a larger share of reserve grain. A 25 May article broadcast by Harbin radio indicated that this new policy had been implemented successfully in Heilungkiang. There the total earnings of people's communes were said to be up 4 percent over 1970, but distribution to commune members and per capita income were disproportionately higher, 12.4 percent and 9.4 percent respectively.

While the Harbin results indicate that at least some party policies on agriculture are now being implemented, a 5 May PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary indicated that there is still a long way to go. The commentary revealed that in order to achieve the all-important increases in per mou grain output some areas had "ignored total production" and "even limited the total farming area" in an effort to surpass the per mou quota of the national program for agricultural development. The commentary noted that such tactics run counter to the spirit of the agricultural program and called for an end to "playing with figures."

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P R C - E U R O P E

PEKING PROMOTES CLOSER COOPERATION AGAINST THE SUPERPOWERS

Reflecting its interest in encouraging European states to work more closely together in order to enhance their influence and independence vis-a-vis the superpowers, Peking has played up Anglo-French cooperation as evidenced in Queen Elizabeth's

9 May visit to France and has highlighted Romanian-Yugoslav solidarity following the Tito-Ceausescu meeting inaugurating the Iron Gates hydroelectric project on 16-17 May. Peking has made use of these events to portray a growing trend on the continent toward a "European Europe" free from dependence on either the Soviet Union or the United States and capable of defending its interests against superpower pressures.

ANGLO-FRENCH
RELATIONS

NCNA's 21 May account of Queen Elizabeth's visit to France--noting that she had broken the tradition that the British monarch pays only one state visit to a foreign country during his or her reign--portrayed this step as a further indication in the aftermath of the two Heath-Pompidou summits over the past year of Anglo-French determination to achieve closer unity against outside "intervention and domination." NCNA quoted President Pompidou as saying "dangers that menace our liberty and independence" had constrained Britain and France to transform their relations and contribute to European strength both economically and politically. As a framework for Anglo-French cooperation, NCNA stressed the importance of the newly expanded Common Market, noting in particular that British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home and French Foreign Minister Schumann held talks during the Queen's visit concerning the planned summit of the Common Market Ten this October. The account cited LE MONDE for the judgment that the "only and valid choice" for Britain and France is to work with their partners to strengthen the European Communities so that Europe remains "the master of its destiny" and is able to express a point of view which "does not identify with that of one or the other superpower."

Reporting a policy statement by French Premier Chaban-Delmas on 23 May, an NCNA dispatch on the 24th played up the dual themes of French national independence and an independent European Europe. In a passage serving in effect to explain Peking's own nuclear weapons program, NCNA quoted Chaban-Delmas'

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defense of France's nuclear force as a "vital condition" for its national security. The account cited the premier's disagreement with the view that the primary responsibility for France's security should devolve upon a "big ally" to which the French army would provide only infantry support. Implicitly drawing a parallel between French and Chinese defense postures, NCNA took note of his assertion that the development of nuclear weapons permits France, which is not a superpower, to protect itself from aggression.

TITO-CEAUSESCU
MEETING

Reporting on the joint communique issued on the talks between Tito and Ceausescu at the Iron Gate, NCNA on 18 May made a point of underscoring the "special value and significance" attached by these independent-minded leaders to their relations based on "full observance of the principles of national independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs, equal rights and mutual advantage." In a passage with antisuperpower overtones, NCNA quoted the communique as saying that "in some regions of the world the policy of strength, of domineering continues endangering the independence, freedom, and security of the world peoples."

In contrast to its full coverage of Yugoslav-Romanian accord on bilateral issues and the need for independence, NCNA was more selective in its account of the communique's treatment of international issues. Thus, while NCNA cited the communique's criticism of U.S. actions in Vietnam, the account ignored the document's endorsements of the 1967 UN resolution on the Middle East, the Soviet and Polish treaties with West Germany, and an early convocation of a European security conference. Peking's rivalry with Moscow gives it ground for reservations or an opposing view on these issues, though it has muted its opposition in order not to alienate countries with which it otherwise has common interests.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

MASHEROV PROTEGE NAMED FIRST DEPUTY AGRICULTURE MINISTER

RURAL LIFE on 19 May identified L.I. Khitrin, Belorussian deputy premier in charge of agriculture, as the new USSR First Deputy Minister of Agriculture succeeding I.P. Volovchenko, whose appointment as RSFSR Minister of Sovkhozes was announced on 21 March. Khitrin's appointment may foreshadow the adoption on a national level of controversial agricultural innovations promoted by Belorussian party First Secretary Masherov. It may also signify a closer relationship between Masherov and CPSU Politburo agricultural supervisors Polyanskiy and Kulakov, who presumably approved the appointment and who have been accorded unusually high rankings in recent Belorussian portrait lineups.

Khitrin was appointed head of the Belorussian Agricultural Equipment Association in December 1962, a week after Belorussian cadre secretary Masherov was promoted to republic second secretary. After Masherov replaced Mazurov as republic first secretary, Khitrin continued in this post until February 1971, when he was promoted to Belorussian deputy premier in charge of agriculture.

Khitrin's elevation to the national leadership post only a little more than a year later serves, ironically, to remove him from the Belorussian scene at a time when the republic's leaders are deeply preoccupied with agricultural shortcomings. In a March speech Masherov revealed that as a result of extreme cold and insufficient snow in January, 165,000 hectares of winter crops were totally destroyed, another 395,000 hectares were damaged badly enough to require resowing, and 240,000 hectares of perennial forage crops were damaged (SOVIET BELORUSSIA, 3 March 1972). Not all the blame was placed on the weather, however. Belorussian agricultural agencies were also attacked for poor work; and when a Belorussian competition for provision of fodder for livestock ended in February, no oblast prizes were awarded because "not one oblast fulfilled the conditions" of the competition (SOVIET BELORUSSIA, 29 February 1972).

BELORUSSIAN INNOVATIONS Khitrin's appointment may foreshadow a wider application of agricultural innovations developed in Belorussia and personally endorsed by Masherov. One of these innovations, the so-called "shop" (tsekh) system of farm management, was introduced in some Grodno oblast kolkhozes in 1970 in an effort to promote greater farm specialization and efficiency.

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Under this system, separate "shops" were created for livestock raising, farming, and mechanization with specialists as "shop" directors, and numerous intermediate administrative links were eliminated in the process, with a consequent reduction in administrative costs and personnel. In Grodno the "shop" system has been combined with the link system of labor organization, which has been widely used in the oblast and has been praised by Grodno First Secretary I.F. Mikulovich (March 1971 PARTY LIFE) and Belorussian Agriculture Secretary V.F. Mitskevich (10 November 1970 RURAL LIFE), as well as by Masherov (24 July 1970 SOVIET BELORUSSIA).

Publicity for the "shop" system has recently started to spread. The innovation was described by Grodno Secretary N.V. Gordikov in the 9 September 1971 SOVIET BELORUSSIA and later in ECONOMY GAZETTE (No. 3, January 1972) and by a Grodno kolkhoz chairman in the 26 January 1972 TRUD. Masherov urged its expansion in a March speech reported in SOVIET BELORUSSIA on 3 March 1972. The Grodno innovation was also praised in a 8 February PRAVDA editorial, which applauded similar experiments in Moscow oblast. And a 2 April RURAL LIFE article by a Kazakh agricultural official reported that more than 40 Kazakh farms had switched to the system in the last two years and that dozens of sovkhoses had followed suit since early 1972.

In another Grodno experiment, the local capital construction departments of the agriculture ministry have been placed directly under oblast and rayon executive committees and have been given increased powers of supervision over rural construction. At the February 1971 Belorussian party congress Masherov endorsed the practice of making such departments the sole contractors for rural construction projects (SOVIET BELORUSSIA, 23 February 1971). In 1971 the Grodno innovation in rural construction was extended to the entire republic, and it recently gained support in Moscow, according to a 7 April RURAL LIFE article by construction editor P.V. Vaynshteyn. Vaynshteyn's article, which praised the Grodno initiative, revealed that the Belorussian experiment and other variants have sparked controversy between rural construction and agriculture ministry officials. The rural builders have complained of delays and disruptions in construction projects caused by farms and agricultural organs, and they have proposed--over the objections of agriculture ministry officials--that control over rural construction projects be concentrated in the capital construction departments.

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PORTRAIT RANKINGS The appointment of Khitrun may also reflect recent changes in Masherov's relations with Mazurov and Polyanskiy, who as first deputy chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers are natural rivals. Belorussian portrait arrangements of Politburo members at the November 1971 and May 1972 parades showed distinct favoritism toward Polyanskiy and Kulakov, ranking Polyanskiy fifth, in the position formerly occupied by native-son Mazurov, and placing him even ahead of Kirilenko. Although the SOVIET BELORUSSIA and ZVYAZDA photos showed only the right-hand side of the Politburo lineup starting with Brezhnev's portrait, the relative positions of Mazurov and Polyanskiy were clearly different from those in Moscow and from earlier Belorussian lineups:

<u>Belorussian portrait lineups 1969-70</u>	<u>Belorussian portrait lineups 1971-72</u>	<u>24th CPSU Congress listing</u>
1. Brezhnev	1. Brezhnev	1. Brezhnev
3. Podgornyy	3. Podgornyy	2. Podgornyy
5. Mazurov	5. Polyanskiy	5. Kirilenko
7. Voronov	7. Kirilenko	6. Pelshe
9. Pelshe	9. Kulakov	7. Mazurov
	11. Pelshe	8. Polyanskiy
	13. Shelest	9. Shelest
		15. Kulakov

The 1971 shift in Belorussian rankings appeared to set Polyanskiy ahead of Mazurov, since Kosygin would presumably be second and Suslov fourth, leaving Mazurov no higher than sixth at best.

The apparent cooling of Masherov's relations with his erstwhile patron Mazurov may be related to differences over economic priorities. As first deputy premier under Kosygin, Mazurov has actively pushed for more resources for light industry. After the May 1970 Politburo decision to increase investments in agriculture, Mazurov in his June USSR Supreme Soviet election speech urged "the same approach . . . for resolving the tasks of supplying the population with enough consumer goods . . ." (SOVIET BELORUSSIA, 5 June 1970). In his June 1971 RSFSR Supreme Soviet election speech he urged all ministries and party organizations to pay more attention to consumer goods production and attacked "economic leaders who have had a scornful attitude toward consumer goods production" (LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, 5 June 1971).

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In contrast, Masherov's public statements during 1970-72 have clearly marked him as a spokesman for economic orthodoxy. Although he criticized economic officials for cutting consumer goods production in his February 1971 Belorussian party congress report, he went out of his way to attack the "cult of things" in his May 1971 Belorussian Supreme Soviet election speech, declaring "we are against a consumer attitude toward socialism; we are against absolutizing material incentives" (SOVIET BELORUSSIA, 1 June 1971). In a 2 February 1972 speech reported in SOVIET BELORUSSIA on the 4th, he again stressed scientific-technical progress and declared that "growth in prosperity" is "not an end in itself." While acknowledging a need to improve public welfare in a February 1972 ZHURNALIST article, he attacked "petty bourgeois tendencies toward acquisition and accumulation" and ridiculed the "concept of comfortable idleness as the ideal of human existence."

It is also noteworthy that Masherov has supported the rural reconstruction program advocated by Polyanskiy and, in fact, developed the prototype for it in Belorussia in 1965-67. Although Masherov has not echoed Polyanskiy's appeals for more resources for agriculture, in his speech to the 24th CPSU Congress he praised the 1970 agricultural measures undertaken by the Politburo and "Brezhnev personally." Moreover, at the February 1971 Belorussian party congress Masherov reiterated his support for the costly village reorganization and rural construction programs and complained that they were going too slowly.

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MONGOLIA

FUNERAL SERVICES FOR SAMBUU REFLECT MPR SUBSERVIENCE TO USSR

The funeral services held in Ulan Bator on 24 May for MPR head of state Jamrangiyn Sambuu underscored Mongolia's firmly pro-Soviet position within the international communist movement. Leading Moscow's delegation to the funeral was Politburo member Polyanskiy, who was given the honor of being the sole foreign representative to deliver a eulogy at the ceremony. All Soviet bloc nations were also represented by Politburo members, as were delegations from North Korea and North Vietnam, while Cuba and Yugoslavia sent lower-level officials.

Reflecting the continued cool state of Sino-Mongolian relations, there was no PRC delegation reported in attendance, although the Chinese did not let the event pass unnoticed. Ulan Bator announced on the 23d that the PRC embassy, along with other foreign missions, had offered its condolences on Sambuu's death on that day. NCNA on the 22d issued a short dispatch on Sambuu's death and reported a message of sympathy to the Great People's Hural of the MPR from the Standing Committee of the NPC. On the following day, NCNA reported that PRC Acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu and NPC Vice Chairman Kuo Mo-jo had paid a condolence call on the MPR Embassy and that wreaths had been sent there by Premier Chou En-lai, the NPC Standing Committee, and the PRC Foreign Ministry. These observances reflected the absence of party relations between Peking and Ulan Bator.

In his brief remarks at the ceremony in Ulan Bator on the 24th, Polyanskiy offered standard praise for Sambuu's contribution to solidifying the "fraternal friendship" between the USSR and the MPR, leaving it to the Mongolians to voice Ulan Bator's dependent and subservient position vis-a-vis Moscow. In the main address at the ceremony, party chief Tsedenbal obsequiously lauded the USSR, describing Sambuu's "clear understanding" that the "happiness and progress" of the MPR could only be assured through "union and friendship" with the Soviet Union and that Soviet-Mongolian friendship is "our main treasure." In a fawning peroration, Tsedenbal promised over Sambuu's ashes to "cherish and strengthen" Mongolian friendship with the world socialist community and Soviet-Mongolian friendship "above all."

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